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In evolutionary biology, niche construction is sometimes described as a
genuine evolutionary process whereby organisms, through their activities
and regulatory mechanisms, modify their environment such as to steer
their own evolutionary trajectory, and that of other species. There is ongoing
debate, however, on the extent to which niche construction ought to be con-
sidered a bona fide evolutionary force, on a par with natural selection.
Recent formulations of the variational free-energy principle as applied to the
life sciences describe the properties of living systems, and their selection in evol-
ution, in terms of variational inference.We argue that niche construction can be
described using a variational approach.We propose new arguments to support
the niche construction perspective, and to extend the variational approach to
niche construction to current perspectives in various scientific fields.1. Introduction
Niche construction refers to any (implicit or explicit)modification byorganisms of
the (biotic or abiotic) states of the niche that they and others inhabit [1–3]. Niche
construction theory (NCT) casts niche construction and ecological inheritance (the
inheritance of selection pressures modified by organisms) as bona fide evolution-
ary processes acting in tandemwith standard evolutionary processes like natural
selection. NCT studies the way organisms (i) generate non-random biases on
selection pressures, (ii) stabilize environmental conditions [1], (iii) and secure
organism–niche complementarity (adaptation) [2]. Central to NCT is the view
of reciprocal causation, which refers to the fact that developing systems can be
both the products and causes of evolution [4].
Reciprocal causal dynamics that pertain to niche construction are expressed at
two temporal scales: the timescale of ontogenyand the timescale of phylogeny [5].
Developmental niche construction (DNC) allows for the optimization of pheno-
types over ontogenetic timescales, via feedback interactions between organisms
and resources of the niche (e.g. parental care and culture acquisition). Selective
niche construction (SNC) acts in tandem with natural selection to optimize
phenotypes over intergenerational timescales by modifying selection pressures.
It concerns consequences of feedback interactions that span over multiple
generations (e.g. ecological inheritance).
There is much debate among proponents of the modern synthesis (MS) in
biology as to whether niche construction is a bona fide evolutionary process
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niches on evolutionary processes [8], but tend to under-
emphasize their significance. For instance, environmental
modifications emanating from organisms’ activity are gener-
ally cast as being on a par with random environmental
changes, e.g. the effects of tsunamis, or volcanic eruptions [8].
The aim of this paper is to review and integrate recent
theoretical work on niche construction in neuroscience,
biology and anthropology [1,5,9–18]. We present the theoreti-
cal foundations and modelling heuristics for a novel
computational framework for niche construction dynamics.
The variational approach casts evolutionary processes in gen-
eral as approximate Bayesian (variational) inference, serving
the attainment of maximum attunement between the states
of an organism and the states of its environment [19] (i.e.
the occupation of local free-energy minima in the organ-
ism–niche state space). For instance, natural selection can
be cast as a process of variational inference, in the sense
that the fittest phenotype for a given ecological niche is also
the one most likely to be found in that niche and populate
it, given a set of environmental constraints. Somatic changes
can be cast as a Bayesian update of the parameters of the
model embodied by the organism, and genotypic change
through natural selection can be cast as a process of Bayesian
model selection [20–24] (see the electronic supplementary
material for further details).
Central to this paper, the variational (free-energy)
approach supports the view of niche construction as a bona
fide evolutionary process. Specifically, it may provide a
principled method of quantifying the complementarity that
obtains between organisms and their niche via niche con-
struction, as well as a computationally tractable definition of
algorithmic information [25] and its transmission via ecological
inheritance [3]. We discuss the implications of this framework
with respect to extensions of the niche construction perspective
in developmental psychology (e.g. [26]). Overall, the vari-
ational approach could provide a promising modelling tool
for research on the niche construction perspective.2. The scope of niche construction theory
In this section, we review recent developments in the litera-
ture on NCT, namely the views on DNC and SNC, and
present the standard critiques of NCT, which we interpret
under the lens of the variational approach in the final section
of the paper.
2.1. Selective niche construction
From the point of view of SNC, the ecological niche comprises
the set of environmental factors that causally influence
the inclusive fitness (rates of survival and reproduction) of
organisms, emphasizing those produced by organisms. SNC
encompasses all such environmental changes, ranging from
the constitution of a layerofwarm,moist air aroundhomeother-
mic organisms [27], or the ability of earthworms and benthic
diatoms to self-impose selection pressure through changes in
structure and chemical composition of their local environment
[28,29], to development of complex behavioural patterns like
human communication and cultural systems [30–33].
It is important to note, however, that while any modifi-
cation to the environment is part of niche construction, only
those that have an impact on the scales of development,ecology or evolution ought to be considered as meaningful
for NCT. For instance, one might argue that to induce a
layer of moist air is not a process powerful enough to have
a significant impact on the relevant scales. Advocates of
NCT generally argue that the extent to which one should
cast a given kind of modification of the environment as
relevant niche construction is ultimately an empirical matter.
2.2. Developmental niche construction
The developmental niche, as a temporal subset of the selective
niche, comprises the set of environmental parameters that
enable the development of organisms over ontogeny [5]. It is
a reliably inherited, intricate structure of physical, social and
epistemic resources that enables the reconstruction of the
species-typical developmental trajectory (i.e. the adaptive life
cycle), as well as the production of adaptive phenotypic vari-
ations [34]. By providing reliably inheritable and contextually
flexible inputs for developmental plasticity, for instance by
canalizing certain forms of phenotypic accommodation, DNC
scaffolds phenotypes at mechanistic and ontogenetic scales [5].
Exogenetic factors may comprise complex behavioural pat-
terns like parental care, stimulation of offspring and social
learning, and function as crucial resources for normal develop-
ment ([5,31,35–37], cf. the earlier concept of ‘ontogenetic niche’
[38]). Other exogenetic resources in the developmental niche
include myriad social and transgenerational relationships,
e.g. cooperative breeding [39], shared patterned cultural prac-
tices [40,41] and regimes of attention [42]. Crucially, these
factors enable organisms to acquire the expectations (and, in
humans, the norms) that regulate communities, and to learn
the practices that have adapted to the particular niche through
cultural evolution and culture–gene coevolution [37].
2.3. Standard critiques of NCT
Proponents of the MS are critical of NCT. Part of their motiv-
ation is that they understand causation in evolution as
unidirectional. On this account, evolutionary processes begin
with environmental (biotic and abiotic) selection pressures,
and culminate in genotypic changes that secure adapted
phenotypes. Although MS acknowledges some cases of reci-
procal causation in evolution (e.g. sexual selection), it casts
environmental modifications stemming from organismic
activity as being the same in kind as those that stem from
random natural environmental changes, i.e. they do not
count as evolutionary processes properly speaking [6,7].
With standard evolutionary processes (e.g. natural selec-
tion), traits that enhance fitness are systematically retained,
and those that do not are lost. This explains the appearance of
adaptive design. With niche construction, it is unclear whether
or not niches adapt the environment to the organism in a sys-
tematic way, because constructed environments can lead both
to increase and decrease of reproductive success [6]. Moreover,
the standard model of evolution allows scientists to make pre-
dictions about the effects of natural selection on design, and
on the optimization of inclusive fitness [43]. Because of the
lack of systematicity of niche construction effects, NCT might
not be able to generate predictions about adaptation.
Perhaps the most extensive critique of NCT was offered by
Richard Dawkins ([44], cf. [45]). He dismisses NCT’s claim of
cyclical causality between the genome and environmental
modifications induced by organisms. On his account, most of
the effects of organismic activity of the environment are just
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[44]. For instance, beaver kits (and grandkits) may gain repro-
ductive success from a well-constructed dam, and this might
encourage the preservation of alleles underlying the behaviour
of dam construction. Effects on other species, however, are not
directly relevant to the beaver’s, and should, therefore, be con-
sidered as mere by-products. One ought not to confusedly cast
the dam as an adaptation and the dam as a by-product, or con-
fuse ‘beaver dams with the beaver’s dungs’ [46]. The scope of
NCT, however, goes beyond the adaptations\by-products
dichotomy to emphasize the underestimated role of the latter
in evolutionary feedbacks.
The variational approach explored in the remainder of this
paper puts into perspective the relevance of the distinction
between adaptations and by-products. Consequences of an
organism’s activity, in either case, can be framed as contribut-
ing to the attainment of maximum statistical attunement with
the environment, which we cast below as the minimization of
variational free energy.06853. Variational free energy and the dynamics
of life
In this section, we present the conceptual foundations and
motivation for the variational (free-energy) principle in
relation to biological self-organization (see §4.1. for a formal
description). The main ideas discussed here are the statistical
conception of the phenotype, and the dynamics underwriting
its organization.3.1. A statistical conception of the phenotype
The variational free-energy principle (FEP) has been applied
fruitfully to yield a statistical conception of the dynamics of
life [47]. The key idea behind this principle is that the bounded
set of characteristic states in which an organism maintains
itself most of the time, and in which it is most likely to find
itself, can be interpreted as the set of its phenotypic states, i.e.
its specific repertoire of functional or adaptive states, its physi-
ology and morphology, and its sensorimotor patterns. Since
these characteristic states are visited more frequently than
others, they are associated with a higher probability than
other states (e.g. a fish is more likely to find itself in water
than anywhere else). This statistical conception of the pheno-
type is supported by simulation studies of the emergence of
biological self-organization and morphogenesis [47,48], and
further evidence comes from the study of early myelopoiesis
in real biological systems (e.g. [49]).
Phenotypic states subsume all states of an agent, from
quickly fluctuating ones (e.g. its temperature or visually
evoked responses), to slowly fluctuating states that constrain
fast dynamics (e.g. its morphology, structure and neuronal
connectivity). Later, we will consider this distinction in terms
of the distinction between stable and unstable dynamics in
synergetics [50], where the latter (unstable, slow) modes corre-
spond to order parameters, and will be associated with ‘traits’ of
phenotypes, which can include states of the niche. Thus, the
conception of the phenotype that interests us here can be
framed in terms of a joint phenotypic space that includes states
internal (e.g. phenotypic states) and external (e.g. phenotypic
traits) to the organism, biotic and abiotic.3.2. Motivation and problem
Organisms are open systems. Yet, they maintain their organiz-
ation over time in the face of environmental perturbations.
Therefore, one must assume (a priori) that they manage to
limit the entropy of their states [51]. Technically, entropy
(as an information theoretic quantity) is the long-term average
of self-information or ‘surprisal’. Surprisal reflects the likeli-
hood of an outcome—it is the negative log probability of any
sensory state being encountered. Organisms that maintain
their continued existence spend most of their time in attract-
ing states, and will, therefore, have a low average surprisal
and low entropy. Note that one could also define entropy
(as a thermodynamic quantity) in the following way. Under
ergodic assumptions (that is, under the assumption that the
system has properties that can be measured more than
once), surprisal is equivalent to a thermodynamic potential
energy [52]. Although the stationary distributions involved
do not necessarily have a Boltzmann–Gibbs form, recent
developments finesse the difficulties in identifying potential
functions that play the role of an adaptive landscape: see
[53] for a technical discussion. Only the information theoretic
definition concerns us directly in this paper.
Because surprisal depends on hidden causes in the
environment, the organism (e.g. its brain) cannot directly
assess it. Here is where the variational free energy comes in.
Mathematically, it constitutes an upper bound on surprisal,
and thereby implicitly bounds its average, namely, entropy.
Variational free-energy reports a deviation from, and is
conditioned on, a set of priors, which are operationalized in
a hierarchical, probabilistic generative model of the hidden
causes of sensory inputs (observations) [20]. Priors are
probability distributions or Bayesian beliefs that provide con-
straints on lower levels, in hierarchical models. Because they
are themselves parametrized, they can be optimized via hyper-
parameters that depend upon the sensory observations (refer
figure 1 and §4.1 below for technical details).
A generative model is a mapping from sensory obser-
vations, action policies, to external (hidden) causes. These
causes constitute the generative process, which describes the
transitions among hidden causes in the world (including the
organism’s own actions) that generate sensory inputs [55].
The generative model is conditioned on the prior (Bayesian)
beliefs of the organism. These beliefs are parametrized by a
density that is encoded by the internal states of the organism
(e.g. brain states). See figure 1 for a discussion. This density rep-
resents the ‘best guess’ of the organism as to the causes of its
sensations. Updates of the generative model conform to the
principles of variational inference. This involves approximat-
ing the generative process by optimizing parameters of the
internal density, with respect to the free energy bound on Baye-
sian model evidence (sometimes referred to as an evidence
bound). This bound means that if one changes some prob-
ability distribution (i.e. beliefs) over the causes of observed
data to minimize variational free energy, one is effectively
maximizing model evidence [52].
Thus, although it cannot track surprisal directly, the
organism can track a proxy quantity (an upper bound),
the variational free energy. By minimizing free energy (or
maximizing model evidence), the organism can estimate
surprise, and thereby avoid deleterious phase transitions
and maintain its phenotypic organization. Hence, the long-
term, evolutionary (distal) imperative for the organism to
active states
external states internal states
sensory states
brain
s a
external states internal states
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b
environment organism
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= –Gss · —s (F(h, b)
a˙ = fa (m, b) + w
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Figure 1. Markov blankets. These schematics illustrate the partition of states into internal and hidden or external states that are separated by a Markov blanket
(b) comprising sensory and active states. (a) A schematic that captures the relations of reciprocal causation between the organism and its environmental niche [54].
Changes in states of the organism over time are a function of the immediate state of the organism (m) and its environment (h), and, reciprocally, changes in the
states of the organism’s environmental niche over time are a function of the current state of the environment and the organism. The form of this dynamical coupling
can now be specified by appeal to the FEP. This introduces a separation of organismic and environmental states (i.e. internal and external states) via an intervening
Markov blanket of active (a) and sensory states (s). Once the Markov blanket is in place, the non-equilibrium steady-state dynamics are prescribed by the Fokker
Planck equation that can be expressed in terms of gradient flows on variational free energy. (b) This partition (and flows) as it would be applied to action and
perception in the brain, where active and internal states minimize a free-energy functional of internal and blanket states. The ensuing self-organization of internal
states then corresponds to perception, while action couples brain states back to external states. However, because of the antisymmetry of the conditional depen-
dencies implicit in the Markov blanket, we can also express external dynamics as a gradient flow of a free-energy functional of external and blanket states. (c) Shows
exactly the same dependencies but rearranged so that the internal states are associated with the intracellular states of a cell, while the sensory states become the
surface states of the cell membrane overlying active states (e.g. the actin filaments of the cytoskeleton). For simplicity, we have admitted the solenoidal flow in this
figure. For a more complete account, see [47]. (Online version in colour.)
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imperative to avoid surprisal by minimizing free energy
(see §4.2. for the mathematical details).
3.3. Maximizing model evidence through action and
perception
Active inference is the self-evidencing process by which the
organism garners and produces evidence for the generative
model that it instantiates by existing. At the scale of organisms
interacting with their niche, active inference is realized in pat-
terns of action and perception. Action allows the organism to
gather more precise (Bayesian) model evidence: sensory
samples reduce uncertainty with respect to the causes of sen-
sory states. In turn, the role of perception, sometimes called
‘perceptual inference’, is to update the system’s priors while
informing action. This process amounts to minimizing thesurprisal expected following an action, where expected surprisal
is also known as uncertainty. In other words, all action is—at
one level—in the game of resolving uncertainty and minimiz-
ing surprisal. Given the statistical conception of the phenotype
described above, the upshot is that we can interpret active
inference as the generalized homeostasis and allostasis of an
organism [21,56].
Relating these ideas to the core of our discussion,
variational free energy is minimized at all scales of self-
organization; from the ensemble behaviour of macromolecules
to evolutionary dynamics [57]. It is a purely information
theoretic construct that generalizes thermodynamic free
energy. It can provide an upper bound on the (log)
evidence for the exchange of a structure like a cell with its
environment. This evidence can either be interpreted as self-
information (a.k.a. surprisal), such that the time integral of
self-information becomes the entropy of environmental
rsif.royalsocietypublishing.org
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tive model, one can associate the biophysical states of any
living system (cell, brain, phenotype, species, etc.) with the
sufficient statistics of the generative model.
The variational free energy is then a functional of the
environmental (e.g. sensory) input to the system and the prob-
ability distribution over causes of that input parametrized by
the system’s internal states (e.g. intracellular concentrations,
neuronal connectivity, anatomical infrastructure, etc.). Cru-
cially, the generative process generating the input may be
formally distinct from the generative model of that process.
This construction means that the same free-energy functional
is minimized at different spatial and temporal scales, depend-
ing on how the system is defined. This minimization describes,
for example, the chemotactic behaviour of Escherichia coli,
learning in our brains, institutional organization, etc.: see
[47,52] for a detailed discussion and [48] for a worked example
in morphogenesis.
From the perspective of the organism, minimizing free
energy through active inference may feel like constructing
‘designed’ environments [58]. From the niche’s perspective
encoding the traces of organismic activity, it is just ‘learning’
about the phenotypes that inhabit it: both niche and phenotype
are self-evidencing.Mathematically, action on the environment
is the same as the niche sensing an organism. This is key to our
treatment in what follows. If both the niche and organism are
ergodic, then they must both conform to the free-energy prin-
ciple. This implicit symmetry or circular causality means that
free-energy bounding dynamics are also a special case of gen-
eralized synchrony, e.g. two swinging pendulums attached to a
beam that synchronize over time, or between a phenotype (e.g.
me) and (e.g. my) niche, which is usually constituted by other
sentient systems (e.g. like me). This synchrony is what we
associate with (developmental) niche construction dynamics
generating ecological inheritance.4. A variational approach to niche construction
This section summarizes the conceptual and mathematical
analysis that underlies the variational principles supporting
the modelling heuristics for the variational framework of
niche construction.
4.1. Niche construction, variational free energy and
generalized synchrony
This section summarizes the conceptual and mathematical
analysis that underlies the variational principles we are pursu-
ing. The FEP furnishes an interpretation of an agent’s internal
dynamics as a gradient flow on a free-energy functional of sen-
sory states and an approximate posterior based on a generative
model of external dynamics (and how they map to sensory
states). This means that the internal states of an agent acquire
a Bayesian mechanics via an implicit (generative) model of its
environment. This interpretation rests on a distinction between
states that are external and internal to a given agent. This (stat-
istical) separation requires the existence of something called a
Markov blanket—that itself can be divided into active and sen-
sory states [47,59,60]. The only requirement (that licenses a
distinction between internal and external states) is that internal
states cannot directly influence sensory states—and external
states cannot directly influence active states (figure 1).The key move now is to appreciate that the same Bayesian
interpretation can be applied to the external states. This follows
from the antisymmetry of the conditional dependencies that
define the Markov blanket. In other words, we can relabel
internal states as external states and relabel sensory states as
active states. In so doing, the conditional independencies
remain unchanged (figure 1). This means that there must be
a description of niche dynamics, where the environment
models how the agent’s internal dynamics are generating its
active states. From the perspective of the environment, the
agent’s active states now become sensory states and sensory
states become active states. The crucial observation here is
that the agent and eco-niche share the same Markov blanket
and, therefore, mathematically speaking, must be inferring
each other.
On this view, one can now consider the ultimate (non-
equilibrium) steady state of reciprocal exchange between
the agent and its environment. We know that the dynamics
of both external and internal states can be cast as gradient
flows on the respective free energies of the agent and
environment. So, under what conditions would their free
energies be minimized? The following lemma suggests that
this non-equilibrium steady state corresponds to a generalized
synchrony between the agent and niche.
Lemma 4.1. (generalized synchrony). If the internal and
external states of a random dynamical system exhibit general-
ized synchrony, then their variational free energy is jointly
minimized with respect to internal and external states.
ChðhÞ ¼ m
CsðsÞ ¼ a

) @hFðh, aÞ ¼ 0
@mFðm, sÞ ¼ 0
 
) h ¼ argmin Fðh, aÞ
m ¼ argmin Fðm, sÞ
 
hðbÞ W EpðhjbÞ½h
mðbÞ W EpðmjbÞ½m
:
ð4:1Þ
Here, b W ða, sÞ are blanket states that comprise actionand sen-
sory states, respectively, while the external and internal states are
denoted by ðh,mÞ. Generalized synchronization implies a syn-
chronization manifold: M ¼ fðh,mjbÞ:CðhjbÞ ¼ ðmjbÞg, which
has been conditioned on the blanket state. The existence of
this (conditional) manifold is assured because for every given
blanket state, there is an expected external and internal state.
The equations above imply that the existence of a synchroniza-
tion manifold renders the expected states minimizers of their
respective variational free energies.
Proof (heuristic): for simplicity, we will deal with the case of
identical synchronization. Identical synchronization implies
that there is an identity mapping between the external and
internal states and their influences on each other [61,62].
This can be expressed as a synchronization in which the
sensory states of the agent (i.e. active states of the envi-
ronment) become the active states of the agent (i.e. the
sensory states of the environment) and both are perfectly cor-
related. The synchronization manifold can be regarded as a
surface that would be traced out if we plotted the states of
the agent and environment against each other (figure 2
for example).
The free-energy principle says that the flow of internal can
be expressed as a gradient flow on a free-energy functional of
posterior beliefs about external states, qmðhjsÞ encoded by
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Figure 2. A duet for one. In this simulation of free-energy minimization, two birds with the same generative models—but different initial expectations—sing for
2 s and then listen for any response. In the right panels (singing alone), the birds cannot hear each other (because they are too far apart) and the successive epochs
of songs diverge due to the sensitivity to initial conditions implicit in their (chaotic) generative models. The upper panels show the sonogram heard by the first bird.
Because this bird can only hear itself, the sonogram reflects the proprioceptive predictions based upon posterior expectations in the HVC ( first-level expectations) and
area X (second-level expectations). These anatomical designations are based upon the hierarchical generative model illustrated with the insets (left). The posterior
expectations for the first bird are shown in red as a function of time—and the equivalent expectations for the second bird are shown in blue. However, when the
two birds can hear each other (singing together), the posterior expectations are encoded by internal states show identical synchrony at both the sensory and
extrasensory levels—as shown in the middle panels. Note that the sonogram is now continuous over successive 2 s epochs, because the first bird can hear
itself and the second bird. The ensuing synchronization manifold is shown in the lower panels. These plot the second-level (area X) expectations in the
second bird against the equivalent expectations in the first. The left panel shows chaotic and uncoupled dynamics when the birds cannot hear each other,
while the right panel shows the generalized (identical) synchrony that emerges when the birds exchange sensory signals. The different colours correspond to
the three hidden states for each bird. The synchronization manifold for identical synchronization corresponds to the (broken) diagonal line. See [63] for details.
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_h
_m
 
¼ fhðh, aÞfmðm, sÞ
 
¼ Ghh  rhFðh, aÞGmm  rmFðm, sÞ
 
Fðh, aÞ ¼ Eq½ln qhðmjaÞ  ln pðm, aÞ
Fðm, sÞ ¼ Eq½ln qmðhjsÞ  ln pðh, sÞ
¼ Eq½ln pðh, sÞ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
Energy
H½qmðhjsÞ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
Entropy
¼ D½qmðhjsÞjjpðhjsÞ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
KL divergence
 ln pðsÞ|ﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄ}
Log evidence
  ln pðsÞ
¼ D½qmðhjsÞjjpðhÞ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
Complexity
Eq½ln pðsjhÞ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
Accuracy
: ð4:2Þ
The free energy has beenwritten here (for internal states) in
several ways that provide a useful interpretation. The firstdecomposes the free energy into an energy and entropy term
by analogy with statistical thermodynamics. The second
rearrangement is more common in Bayesian statistics and
machine learning. It shows that when the posterior beliefs are
the true posterior density pðhjsÞ, their KL divergence disap-
pears and the free energy becomes negative log evidence
Fðm, sÞ  ln pðsÞ, namely the negative log probability of sen-
sory states, under the generative model of hidden causes and
sensed consequences: pðh, sÞ. This is why the variational free
energy is sometimes called an evidence bound—because it is
always greater than negative log evidence [64,65]. The final
rearrangement shows thatminimizing free energy is effectively
the same as finding accurate explanations that are minimally
complex; i.e. that conform to Ockham’s principle.
Under identical synchronization, M ¼ fðh,m, a, sÞ:h ¼ m,
a ¼ sg the gradient flows in equation (4.2) are identical
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ents are isomorphic on either side of the Markov blanket. In
turn, this means that the generative model entertained by the
agent about its environment is exactly the same as the genera-
tive model entertained by the environment about the agent.
Furthermore, both agent and environment generate sensory
and active states that are congruent with their shared generative
model. This implies that the posterior beliefs (i.e. densities)must
be veridical:
qmðhjsÞ ¼ pðhjsÞ ¼ qhðmjaÞ ¼ pðmjaÞ: ð4:3Þ
Substituting this into the expressions for free energy above
shows that the divergence term disappears, and the free
energy attains its lower bound.
Fðh, aÞ ¼  ln pðaÞ
Fðm, sÞ ¼  ln pðsÞ

) @hFðh, aÞ ¼ 0
@mFðm, sÞ ¼ 0
 
: ð4:4Þ
In other words, the generative model of both agent and
niche are the veridical explanations of their respective sensory
fluctuations and the variational free energies of both are jointly
minimizedwith respect to the posterior beliefs parametrized by
their respective states.
Remark 4.1. For simplicity, we have just dealt with the situ-
ation of identical synchrony. Clearly, there will be formal
asymmetries in the external structure of the environment
and the internal structure of the agent. The above arguments
must, therefore, be generalized (heuristically), such that the
synchronization between internal and external states is gener-
alized. Usually, in dynamical systems theory, generalized
synchronization is considered in the light of skew product
systems (i.e. master–slave systems) [61]. The twist here is
that there is a bidirectional coupling that is actively main-
tained. This active maintenance rests upon a corollary of
generalized synchrony; namely, that there is a generalized
synchrony between the active and sensory states from the
point of view of both the agent and niche. In other words,
for generalized synchrony to emerge (i.e. for the minimiz-
ation of joint free energy) it is necessary that both systems
supply the right sort of sensory impressions that enable
them to implicitly infer each other.4.2. Minimal simulation of organism–niche synchrony
Clearly, the above construction starts to look like a model of
communication. Indeed, the notion of generalized synchrony
across a shared Markov blanket has been used previously to
model communication in computational neuroscience—and
resolve the problem of neuronal hermeneutics (i.e. inferring
what was meant by reference to a shared narrative). Figure 2
illustrates the generalized (identical) synchrony that emerges
when two synthetic songbirds can hear each other singing [63].
In the present setting, this can be regarded as a minimal
simulation of the coupling between an agent and its niche,
where the niche is another agent. Niche construction, in a
broad sense, involves the modification of both biotic and abio-
tic ‘agents’. As discussed above, those modifications amount
to learning via sensory and active (active inference) exchanges,
also in a broad sense, among agents populating the niche.
This perspective on mutual influence—that is an emergent
property of minimizing ( joint) free energy—can be applied to
multiple agents. A nice example of this is the joint free-energyminimization exhibited by simulations of cells that have a
common (generative) model of their place within a tissue or
organ; see [48,60] for details. In short, the same form of gener-
alized synchrony (to a point attractor) can be used to model
morphogenesis, where the environment is constituted by
other agents with Markov blankets (i.e. other cells), who
share the same generative model. This example is particularly
interesting, because the evidence for the shared model now
becomes the lower bound for the joint free energy [48].
The mathematical image of generalized synchrony, cast in
terms of variational free-energy minimization, resonates
nicely with earlier formulations of self-organization in cyber-
netics; namely, the good regulator theorem [66]. Here, the
good regulator theorem applies not just to the regulator
(agent) but also the (environmental) system that is being
regulated (i.e. niche), conferring them both the status of
agent. Clearly, to become a good model of one’s niche, one
needs to infer its causal structure.
In terms of the Bayesianmechanics above, this corresponds
to a slow gradient flow on variational free energy averaged
over time (in a path integral sense) [67,68]. In other words,
there are certain states within and beyond the Markov blanket
that constitute order parameters [50,69], or parameters of the
generative model that are subject to the same free-energy mini-
mizing pressures as fast fluctuations normally interpreted in
terms of inference. The distinction between phenotypic states
and traits maps to the distinction between the internal states
that fluctuate quickly and slowly, where it is tempting
to associate phenotypic traits with the order parameters of
synergetics [50,70]—evolving over very slow (somatic or devel-
opmental) timescales. In relation to the statistical conception of
the phenotype described earlier (cf. §3.1.), and the organism–
niche synchrony described above, we can associate some of
these phenotypic traits to order parameters that pertain to
the material setting of the physical environment. These
undergo even slower fluctuations caused, notably, by the
niche construction.
We introduce the distinction between fast inference and
slow learning because simulations suggest that important
asymmetries in theway that the agent learns about the environ-
ment—and the environment learns about the agent—can have
profound effects on niche construction. In brief, if the (implicit)
generative model of the environment holds very precise beliefs
about certain dynamics, then the organism will come to learn
the environment more quickly than the environment will
learn about the agent. Conversely, when action upon the
environment effectively teaches the environment about the
agent—and the environment holds imprecise beliefs about
the agent—the environment will yield to the agent’s beliefs
more readily (cf. results summarized in figure 3 [71]).
The asymmetry in learning between organisms and their
environment will be central to our discussion of ecological
inheritance in §5.2. In brief, the asymmetry in learning rate
between the environment and organisms allows material
features of the environment to ‘retain’ regularities in behav-
ioural patterns of groups of organisms unfolding over long
timescales (e.g. cultural practices). These are ‘encoded’ through
fast inference and niche construction by individual organisms.
These may be viewed as order parameters encoded in the
material features of the environmental, which are part of the
joint phenotypic space (including slowly fluctuating traits,
and quickly fluctuating states), and which are passed on
through ecological inheritance.
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Figure 3. Learning and communication. (a) Shows epoch by epoch changes in the posterior expectations (lines) of an order parameter of the first bird (blue) and
second bird (green) determining the (chaotic) structure of the songs of the sort shown in figure 2. The shaded areas correspond to 90% (prior) Bayesian confidence
intervals. The broken lines (and intervals) report the results of the same simulation, but when the birds could not hear each other. (b) Shows the synchronization of
extrasensory (higher) posterior expectations for the first (i) and subsequent (ii) exchanges, respectively. This synchronization is shown by plotting a mixture of
expectations (and their temporal derivatives) from the second bird against the equivalent expectations of the first bird, where this mixture is optimized assuming
a linear mapping. In this example of perceptual learning via free-energy minimization, the second (green) bird had more precise beliefs about its order parameter
and, therefore, effectively, taught the first third. Note that in both scenarios, learning converges to the same value resulting in a generalized synchrony between self
and non-self; i.e. beyond self-organization. See Friston & Frith [71] for details.
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other, the (order) parameters of the two respective generative
models were optimized with respect to their respective
variational free energies. Crucially, one bird had relatively
precise beliefs about the autonomous dynamics generating
birdsong, while the other had less precise beliefs. The first
bird, therefore, essentially learned from the second. On the
current argument, we can associate the agent and environ-
ment with either bird, to introduce the notion that the
environment may learn about the agent or the agent can
learn about the environment, or that both can occur at the
same time. The simulations of generalized synchrony (using
birdsong) reported in this paper can be reproduced using
the academic software available from http://www.fil.ion.
ucl.ac.uk/spm/software/. Typing DEM at the MATLAB
prompt will invoke a graphical user interface. The simu-
lations can be reproduced by selecting Birdsong duet button.
This allows users to examine the code (DEM_demo_duet.m)
and subroutines—and customize them at their discretion.Here, the ensemble that realizes the generalized syn-
chrony consists in the entire population (the two birds)
along with their local environment (for each bird, the other
bird). In the simulation, the free energy of one bird is a func-
tional of (sensory) signals from the environment (the other
bird), while the free energy of the environment depends
upon (action) signals from the bird. In principle, this equips
the bird–environment system, or niche, with a measure of
complementarity in relation to the phenotypes it hosts. Because
the free energies of each bird and their respective environ-
ment (the other bird) are extensive quantities (i.e. they can
be added together), we have, in principle, a way of scoring
the coevolutionary complementarity among the various
biotic and abiotic agents of a niche, which is simply the
sum of their respective variational free energies. Increase in
complementarity correlates with decrease in free energy. Cru-
cially, this measure transcends any particular context, and can
be compared quantitatively at different spatio-temporal
scales (e.g. between two agents, two groups, two species).
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[47] and [72] for a complementary treatment of self-organized
criticality (i.e. critical slowing), variational free-energy
minimization and generalized synchrony. We now turn the
key role of precision estimation in determining the level of
symmetry of exchange between agents and environment.
4.3. Niche construction and synchrony: a mechanism for
meta-learning
The FEP understands precision estimation (the estimation of
the reliability of sensory information) as ameta-learningmech-
anism, because it allows the organism to know what worth
learning [73]. Learning precision is a crucial part of the attune-
ment to causal regularities in the environment. For instance,
humans have evolved a host of phenotypic expressions, from
highly visible white sclera and gaze tracking abilities, to cul-
tural ‘prestige cues’, which optimize the process of learning
from whom and what to learn [37].
Constructed aspects of the niche can play an important
role in learning, and estimating precision. Consider ‘desire
paths’ in humans [74]. Such paths can be the by-products
of people cutting through the grass rather than following
the paved road. Over time, a dirt trail might form, thereby
attracting additional pedestrians and reinforcing the trail in
a looping manner, which will further steer future interactions
between the users and their niche.
In this example, niche construction is mostly implicit:
pedestrians need not be aware that they are constructing a
path, or aware of how their action on the environment can
benefit them, or impact others. They merely act in accordance
both with local constraints, and with respect to their expec-
tations (e.g. the desire to reach the extremity of the park).
This highlights the fact that in general, we can expect physical
changes produced through active inference to be consistent
with, or complement the organisms’ expectations.
Lasting physical changes to the environment produced via
niche construction function as high fidelity, precise sources of
information. By actively engaging their environment, organ-
isms—and indeed, entire populations—fit their niches to
their prior expectations, e.g. in desire paths. Information rel-
evant to the generation of adaptive responses is encoded in
the physical environment (cf. [18]), thereby directing the learn-
ing of causal regularities, and aiding the organism inmanaging
uncertainty (cf. [75–78]) (e.g. there is a high probability that I
end up faster to the other extremity of the park if I follow
this trail). Salient aspects of the niche modulate the attention
of organisms and direct active inference [42,79,80] by ground-
ing learning in the socio-material fabric: constructed aspects
of the niche function as meta-learning mechanisms and
encode salience.
We use ‘salience’ here in a very particular and formal way
that is consistent with the active inference scheme. Salience is
the information gain, reduction of uncertainty, Bayesian sur-
prise, or epistemic value that constitutes an important part of
expected free energy. In brief, certain environmental cues
(e.g. signs and semiotics) attain salience or epistemic affor-
dance because they indicate the actions that will minimize
expected free energy or, more simply, resolve uncertainty
(see [81] for details). This facilitates substantially the
modelling of the environment by the organism.
An important function of environment-basedmeta-learning
is that it enables organisms to reduce cognitive demands, and ina sense ‘upload’ the computational burden of salience esti-
mation to the environment itself. Hence, it is no stretch to say
that learning what is salient or has epistemic affordance does
not rest solely upon the learning of brain, or body-based
priors, but also on carving out a specifically constructed niche
through the traces left by reiterated action (of self and others,
past and present). This could be an implicit strategy by which
organisms save on metabolic resources. In the parlance of
free-energy minimization, uploading information into the
niche translates to minimizing complexity and associated ther-
modynamic costs of computation via the Jarzynski inequality
[82,83]. Heuristically, it eases the decision-making process by
reducing uncertainty as well as the need for metabolically
expensive, internal (neural) information processing. Uploading
also enables the reduction of model complexity over time by
constraining the hypothesis space that the organism has to
model, narrowing the range of possible priors, and thereby
increasing thermodynamic efficiency [84].5. Applications and predictions
In this section, we discuss the variational approach to niche
construction in relation to situated learning in developmental
psychology and ecological inheritance. We revisit the standard
critiques of NCT under the lens of the variational approach.
5.1. Variational niche construction and situated learning
The idea of the niche as supporting learning is consonant with
new perspectives on niche construction in developmental psy-
chology, especially with the situated learning paradigm (e.g.
[26]). As Flynn and colleagues point out, ‘the niche into
which we are born . . . in part, dictates what we learn’ [26].
One of the functions of the developmental niche is to support
situated learning, defined as the process bywhich an organism
comes to acquire the knowledge necessary to integrate a
‘community of practice’ [85].
This requires of organisms that they engage conventiona-
lized patterns of collective activity, grounded in material
artefacts and other physical aspects of the niche, which
have been transmitted to allow for the progressive integration
of the organism as a legitimate member of the community
[42,85]. From the point of view of NCT, the engagement of
the constructed environment inherited from the community
of practice enables situated learning, and influences the selec-
tion of norms, habits, and values modulating attention
([26,41], cf. the concept of regime of attention [79]).
By providing opportunities for learning how to learn, the
developmental niche does not merely indicate what infor-
mation ought to be learned, but also how best to learn it
[26]. As a meta-learning device, the information encoded in
the material states of the local environment function to
guide active inference by weighting sensory inputs according
to their reliability, or salience, and constitute a more general
device that allow organisms to learn how to learn, by guiding
action–perception cycles (active inference).
5.2. An example of niche constructions as
meta-learning and ecological inheritance
A good example of simple DNC and situated learning is the
process of learning technical skills, for instance the learning
of nut cracking skills by young bearded capuchin monkeys
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capuchin monkeys feed on palm nuts, which they must
crack using stones as hammers, and other stones or logs as
anvils [86]. To learn nut cracking for youngsters is no small
business, as it requires all sorts of complex actions, e.g. prop-
erly placing the nut on the anvil, maintaining the nut stable
throughout the striking action, learning the adequate kind
of striking action that keeps the nut in place while also
have enough velocity to crack open the nut, etc.
Youngsters spend a great deal of time watching and imi-
tating adults’ nut cracking prowess with smaller stones and
nut pieces [16]. Adults, in turn, leave material behind them,
and, importantly, different sorts of reliable ecological traces
like oily residues on the stone anvil site, and pieces of shell,
as well as the hammer stones used for nut cracking, which
further attract and direct youngsters’ interest to the specifics
of the nut cracking site.
These alterations to the environment last for years, even
when exposed to inclement climates. Although the learning
of the nut cracking technique is partly mediated by attending
to adults and imitating them, this, in itself, is not sufficient for
the learning. Rather, it is the high fidelity, lasting changes to
the niche and the technical artefacts left behind by adults that
indirectly biases learning over short and long timescales,
thus supporting persistent practice over the course of
development [16].
Lasting changes made to the developmental niche enable
the acquisition of complex nut cracking skills in youngster
Capuchin monkeys, and supports the passing on of tra-
ditions, defined as the renewed learning of behavioural
patterns by each new generation [36,87]. Crucially, this
depends upon the changes to the niche which extend the
reach of knowledge transmission through the inheritance of
salient information over intergenerational timescales.
In turn, such information transmission depends on two
interrelated processes associated to DNC and SNC: (i) the
construction, engagement, and re-engagement of the develop-
mental niche, along with the information it comprises; (ii) the
slow learning fast inference differential between the environ-
ment, and the organism (cf. §4.2.). Engaging the niche leads
to the accumulation, e.g. of oily residues and nutshells,
which increases the precision of the environment understood
as the propensity to influence learning. A precise environment
is likely to be passed on to the next generation, and thereby can
extend the reach of information transmission.
The sort of (non-genetic) niche inheritance that we describe
here is a form of ecological inheritance, which rests on the inter-
play of two kinds of resources: (i) algorithmic information, and
(ii) material and energetic resources [88]. Algorithmic infor-
mation consists of ‘know-how’-like information encoded by
structural and functional features of the niche (typically, genetic
information or direct knowledge transmission) [25], which is
passed on through standard niche inheritance. Material and
energetic resources typically correspond to abiota (e.g. material
resources like oily residue). Taken in the context of evolutionary
biology (and ecology cf. [89]), algorithmic information is defined
as anything that can reduce organisms’ uncertainty with regard
to possible fitness advantage afforded by the selective environ-
ment [90,91]. It eases the exploitation of the environment, and
in so doing, can causally influence reproductive success [91].
Crucially, on that view, abiota passed on through ecological
inheritance can be a source of algorithmic information, e.g.
knowing how to exploit food resources based on the traces leftby the activity of members of—current and—previous
generations. Following the variational free-energy perspective,
we can further define algorithmic information as salient
information that secures the optimization (e.g. learning and
phenotypic plasticity) of the phenotype throughout develop-
ment; a meta-learning device that members of previous
generations craft through reiterated active inference.
The challengewith algorithmic information is that while its
transmission is costly, it is nonetheless a necessary resource
[91]. The reproduction of the adaptive life cycle that is secured
through development involves myriad environmental manip-
ulations (e.g. building nests, beaver dams and knocking palm
nuts), which often require organisms to know-how to engage
their environment early in development. Organisms can be
informed a priori, for instance, through algorithmic information
that is bound upwith their genetic makeup, but also by having
access to external channels of algorithmic information. The
inheritance of algorithmic information supposes that previous
generations themselves had access to algorithmic information
having enabled them, in the first place, to exploit the resources
of their environment, so as to be efficient enough to afford
passing on this information. The inheritance of algorithmic
information is a costly business, as it necessitates of previous
generation that they invest metabolic resources for its
physical acquisition, storage and use, and transmission [91].
From the point of view of the variational approach,
however, algorithmic information, understood as salient infor-
mation, comes at low cost, as it carries the cognitive burden of
precision estimation in development (cf. end of §4.3.), which is
one of the main mechanism underwriting organisms’ homeo-
stasis (cf. §3.3). Therefore, because the material and energetic
carriers of algorithmic information enable cheaper sensory
information processing, algorithmic information can compen-
sate for its cost of transmission. As salient information, it
could be modelled as environmental precision, and its role in
learning could be explored in simulations similar to the one
presented in §4.2. It can be approached quantitatively as infor-
mation gain cf. §3.3., 4.1.). One could, for instance, test
the function of algorithmic information by comparing the
changes in variational free energy over time between different
organism–niche joint phenotypic spaces, in which agents’
differential saliences could vary within and across trials. Vari-
ations within trials would represent learning in development
(DNC scale), and variation across trials would represent the
inheritance of more or less precise algorithmic information
(SNC scale).
5.3. Critiques revisited and predictions for future
research
We conclude our discussion by considering the challenges to
NCT presented earlier in light of the variational approach to
niche construction (see figure 4 for a visual summary). We
examine some of the predictions of the variational approach
to niche construction with regard to (i) the generation of non-
random, organism-dependent biases on selection pressures;
(ii) the consolidation of organism–niche complementarity
across temporal scales; and (iii) the cross-generational niche
stabilization of environmental conditions.
(i) As a corollary of active inference, niche construction has
a systematic causal influence on fitness, on average and
over time, as it optimizes the attunement of the
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important in organisms for which fitness depends on
the ability to navigate and attune to complex social
environments, and participate in immersive patterned
cultural practices, such as humans [37]. Niche construc-
tion induces changes to the environment that are not
(necessarily) random. On the contrary, many of these
changes (although theymay be implicit) are continuous
with the organism’s expectations (the set of priors
embodied by the organism), as they result from active
inference, which is controlled by these expectations.
We can further predict that some of these changes will
be deeply continuous with the environmental selection
pressures themselves, as these are ‘expected’ by the phe-
notype of the organism. This is so because natural
selection retains sets of priors best adapted to pressures
in first place ([20–24] also see electronic supplementary
material), which active inference brings forth.
(ii) Active inference allows the organism to specify (often
implicitly) those features of the environment that will
be adaptive given the demands of their phenotype, i.e.
they can specify those features of the niche, the learning
ofwhichmakes theman accuratemodel of their environ-
ment. On a developmental timescale, this rests on the
meta-learning function of niche construction, which
guides optimization, or phenotypic plasticity. On the
scale of phylogeny, it rests on the inheritance of con-
straints passed on across generations in the form of
species relevant information (salience), which will
further guide the optimization in development.Therefore, we can expect the DNC–SNC tandem
to tend, over time and on average, to consolidate
organism–niche complementarity across timescales.
(iii) The optimization of organism–niche complementarity
entails the cross-generational stabilization of the features
of the niche, which can be framed as the consolidation of
salience: the more agents implicitly engage a material
locus of information, the more likely this locus is to
further attract engagement, and consequently, the
more salience it can acquire. Because of the nature of
active inference, organisms tend to learn from (adapt
their model to) highly salient environments, potentially
deploying culturally patterned practices built around
these. Interestingly, we can speculate that an environ-
ment that acquires too much salience will become
maladaptive, as the attunement dynamics taking place
in development require that both the organism and the
environment share a certain propensity to learn from
one another (c.f. figure 4).
6. Concluding remarks
The FEP has motivated the production of much research over
the last 10 years. While this work has led to novel theoretical
developments, ecologically valid empirical work is forthcom-
ing still. The approach we propose in this paper faces the
same limits. So far, it can only be used to make predictions,
one of these being that free energy can be cast as an ecological
quantity reporting organism–niche complementarity. Much
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variational approach to niche construction. Nonetheless,
simulation studies can be used to explore the ecological
phase space and to generate predictions about adaptive
solutions to ecological problems, framed as free-energy
bounding problems. Scientists can proceed on the basis of
such predictions and compare these computational models
with empirical data. We can further draw from this approach
an important conceptual point, which can inform theorizing
and empirical work: over time, part of the architecture of
priors embodied by members of a population (brain- and
body-based priors) becomes encoded in the socio-material
setting of the niche. The organism then models an environ-
ment which, in turn, models it back, and thereby living
systems end up expecting a world that reflects their own
expectations. This, however, points to another limit of the vari-
ational approach. Thus far, it has only focused on positive
feedbacks involved in niche construction, in relation to the
adaptation of individual species. Future research should con-
sider the integration of negative feedbacks caused by niche
construction, and how those play out in the dynamical relation
between natural selection and niche construction, and their con-
sequence in eco-evolution. Moreover, future research should
consider the possible limitations of the variational approach
with regard to the complexity of ecological inheritance. For
instance, modelling the full scope of ecological inheritancemight become quickly intractable due to the complexity of the
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